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Across three experiments, I investigated the role of recollection rejection in rejecting 
false suggestions using the misinformation paradigm. The use of model-based measurement of 
recollection rejection was extended to the misinformation paradigm. I manipulated two factors, 
delay and feedback, that are known to influence the use of recollection rejection. Recollection 
rejection was used to reject false suggestions in the misinformation paradigm. Manipulating 
delay time did not affect the acceptance of misinformation or the use of recollection rejection. 
Warning participants about false information reduced misinformation acceptance but did not lead 
to increased rates of recollection rejection. Collectively, these findings suggest an important role 
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Sometimes after a person has witnessed an event they receive false information about 
some of the details of the event. For instance, if the event was a crime, police officers may ask 
leading questions of the witness or the witness may discuss with a co-witness details of the crime 
that are not completely accurate. A phenomenon known as the misinformation effect occurs when 
these false details are incorporated into the witness’s memory of the original event (Loftus, 
1974). Over the years, researchers have discovered many reasons why people come to report 
misinformation (e.g., memory impairment - Loftus, Miller, & Burns 1978; misinformation 
acceptance - McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; and source misattribution errors - Lindsay & 
Johnson, 1987). However, little work has been done to address the issue of how people come to 
reject misinformation. One way that misinformation may be rejected is through the use of a 
memory editing strategy called recollection rejection. Recollection rejection occurs when the 
memory for an item or event disqualifies the possibility of another item or event having 
occurred. Due to the fact that participants are often misinformed about a detail that is mutually 
exclusive from the detail they saw, they may be able to use recollection rejection to reject 
misinformation. The purpose of the current studies is to determine the nature of the use of 
recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm.  
There are multiple ways in which a person may be introduced to false information after 
witnessing an event. For instance, the witness may be interviewed by a police officer who 
unintentionally suggests false information. Imagine that a police officer interviews two witnesses 
who have witnessed a robbery. If the first witness reports that the robber was armed, when the 
police officer interviews the second witness, he or she may ask “What did the armed robber look 





to incorporate the memory of a weapon into his or her memory of the robbery. Another way that 
misinformation can be encountered is through co-witness discussion. One witness may correctly 
remember seeing the robber with a gun, but if another witness mentions that the robber had a 
knife instead, this can lead to the incorporation of these false details into the memory of the 
crime.  
In laboratory settings, the misinformation paradigm usually involves showing participants 
a video or a set of slides, later suggesting false information about the video or slides, and then 
administering a recognition test. The recognition test examines whether participant’s memory of 
the original event has been affected by the false information. Researchers have used a second set 
of altered slides, a narrative about the slides, a co-witness to the event, or an interview about the 
event in order to introduce false information (Gabbert, Memon, & Allan, 2003; Loftus, 1975; 
Takarangi, Parker, & Garry; 2006). Interviews and co-witness discussions about the event are the 
most common ways that a person could potentially encounter false information in the real world 
after witnessing a crime. On average, people report around 30% of the false information as 
having occurred in the witnessed event (Loftus, 2005).  
There are two types of misleading information that have been used to elicit the 
misinformation effect. In some studies, contradictory misinformation, false information that 
directly contradicts a piece of original event information, is used to elicit the misinformation 
effect (Loftus, 1978).  In other studies, additive misinformation, new misinformation which does 
not contradict any of the information shown in the event, is used to induce the misinformation 
effect (Loftus, 1975). Both types of misinformation have successfully elicited the misinformation 
effect (Loftus, 1975; 1978). Loftus (1978) used contradictory postevent information to induce the 





at either a stop sign or yield sign. After viewing the slides, participants filled out a questionnaire 
that had a question that suggested that the car was at either a stop sign or a yield sign, whichever 
piece of information that was the opposite of what they witnessed. Participants given 
contradictory information (e.g., yield sign when they saw a stop sign) were more likely to choose 
the contradictory information than participants given consistent information (e.g., stop sign when 
they saw a stop sign).  
Misleading information may also be introduced that supplants information in the original 
event but does not contradict it. For instance, participants may be told that the man in the slide 
show had a knife when in fact he did not have a weapon at all. Misleading information of this 
type is known as additive misinformation. Loftus (1975) conducted a misinformation study that 
involved giving participants additive misinformation. Participants were informed that they were 
partaking in a study about a car accident. The additive piece of false information was that the car 
passed a barn while driving along a road when in fact this was not in the slide show. Participants 
in the control condition were asked “How fast was the white sports car going while driving along 
the country road?” Participants in the misinformation condition were asked “How fast was the 
white sports car going when it passed the barn while driving along the country road?” (Loftus, 
1975). All participants were asked if they saw the car pass a barn a week later, the participants 
who received the misinformation indicated that they had seen a barn more than participants in 
the control condition.   
Misinformation effects have been effectively established for both additive and 
contradictory misinformation but when misinformation is contradictory, participants may be able 
to employ a memory editing strategy called recollection rejection to reject the misinformation 





for an item or event excludes the possibility of another item or event having occurred. For 
example, a participant using recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation may 
say “I know that the man did not have a knife because I saw him with a gun.” In this example, 
the presence of one weapon excludes the presence of another weapon. When additive 
misinformation is presented, there is no memory for another weapon (i.e., a gun) that could be 
used to reject the claim that the man had a knife.  Frost (2000) examined the differences in 
accepting contradictory and additive misinformation. He found greater false memory for additive 
misinformation in comparison to contradictory misinformation; however, delay was also 
manipulated in this study. Participant’s acceptance of misinformation was not measured until a 
week after they witnessed the event and encountered postevent information. One explanation for 
this finding is that participants used recollection rejection to reject contradictory misinformation. 
Nemeth and Belli (2006) also compared the effects of contradictory and additive misinformation 
but on schematic knowledge. The researchers found no differences between the acceptance of 
contradictory and additive misinformation and cite the short retention interval (i.e., 10 minutes) 
as an explanation for why they did not find a difference between the acceptance of contradictory 
and additive misinformation effects.  Participants may be so good at detecting discrepancies 
between the original event and postevent information soon after the information is presented that 
differences between additive and contradictory misinformation cannot be detected. In order to 
test these effects, the researchers administered a remember/know paradigm to participants. 
Participants reported more ‘know’ responses for additive items than for contradictory items, so it 







The Fate of the Original Memory 
Soon after the initial research on the misinformation effect was published, researchers 
began asking what reporting misinformation meant for the original memory. One possibility is 
that the original memory remains intact even though misinformation is reported on the final test. 
If the original memory is intact, why wouldn’t it be reported? Some researchers believed that 
people report misinformation due to social pressures even though they remember the original 
information (Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). Alternatively, researchers have proposed that encoding 
misinformation causes the original memory to be impaired. Loftus and Greene (1980) tested this 
hypothesis using a lineup study. In these studies, participants were shown either a picture of a 
man, a video of a man, or a live presentation of a man. Participants then received misinformation 
in the form of a picture or video of another man. In this study, a misinformation effect was found 
for face memory. The point of interest is that after participants were debriefed, they were asked 
to choose the face they originally saw. Ninety percent of the participants who originally selected 
the “misinformed” face stuck with their decision. Similarly, a later study by Loftus et al. (1978) 
warned participants that they may have been exposed to false information. After receiving the 
warning, participants were asked about their memory for the misinformation and the majority of 
participants still claimed that they saw the misinformation in the original event. The researchers 
concluded that these findings supported the hypothesis that misinformation impairs or damages 
the original memory. This idea has come to be known as the memory impairment hypothesis. 
Two versions of the memory impairment hypothesis were proposed.  According to the 
destructive updating view, misleading information damages or completely destroys the memory 
trace for the original event in storage (Loftus, 1979). One implication of the destructive updating 





were data on a hard drive that has been completely wiped clean.  The alternate version of the 
memory impairment hypothesis was the interference account (Christiaansen & Ochalek, 1983).  
According to this view, misleading information impairs retrieval of details from the original 
event, but those original details still remain in memory storage.  One way this could occur is 
through blocking.  In blocking, a search of memory stops as soon as information relevant to the 
answer is found. Because the misleading information was presented more recently, it is relatively 
more accessible than the original event information. When the misleading information is 
retrieved on the memory test, it blocks out retrieval of the original event information. 
McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argued that Loftus’ claim that misinformation impaired 
the memory of the original event was unwarranted. They argued that misinformation provides 
people who forget the original event with a choice on the final test. They stated that in the event 
the original memory is not remembered, misinformation does not interfere with the memory of 
the original event but instead is the only source of information available. Additionally, 
McCloskey and Zaragoza argued that sometimes participants may remember both the original 
event information and the false postevent information, but choose the postevent information 
because they believe that the researcher, who suggested the false information, must know his or 
her own study better than the participant.  
To demonstrate this, consider a hypothetical study based on Loftus’s (1977) study in 
which she suggested that a green car that was involved in an automobile accident was actually 
blue. In the car color experiment, some control participants will remember that the car was green. 
According to McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985), these participants should all choose the correct 
response on the final test (i.e., the car was green). It is possible that the control participants will 





information or if they forgot it between the event and test. When control participants forget 
information, it cannot be attributed to the interference of postevent information because control 
participants do not encounter postevent information. When asked if the color of the car was 
green or blue, the control participants who do not remember would be forced to guess. Since 
there are two options on the test, control participants who guess should be accurate 50% of the 
time and inaccurate the other 50% of the time.  
Consider a hypothetical experiment where 40% of the control participants remember the 
car was green and 60% do not, the overall percent correct will be 70% (40% who remember plus 
half of the participants who are guessing 30%). The misinformation effect is detected by 
comparing the difference in the percentages of original information recognized on the 
recognition test between the mislead condition and control condition. Given the example 
provided above about the control participants, less than 40% of the misled participants should 
remember that the car was green if the postevent information actually impaired the memory for 
the original information. Performance on the recognition test would be worse in the misled 
condition than the control condition if fewer misled participants remember the original 
information. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) argue that even if both groups remember the 
original information at the same rate, the mislead condition would still perform worse than the 
control condition. 
If postevent information does not affect mislead participants’ original memory, 40% of 
participants will remember that the car is green and 60% will not. These would be the same rates 
as the control condition. Just like control participants, assume that the mislead participants who 
remember that the car was green will choose the correct response on the test. What about the 





guessing. Participants who do not remember the original event information (green car) but do 
remember the postevent information (blue car) will presumably choose ‘blue car’ on the test and 
therefore be incorrect. Participants who do not remember the original or postevent information 
will be limited to guessing on the recognition test. If any of the participants forget the original 
information (green car) but remember the postevent information (blue car), the accuracy rate of 
misled participants will be lower compared to control participants. By introducing an additional 
source of information, accuracy rates will be lower in the misled condition. This reduction in 
accuracy does not have to be attributed to the memory impairment hypothesis.  
In order to test for these possibilities, McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) developed a 
“modified” final test. In the traditional final test, participants must choose from the piece of 
misinformation (e.g., hammer) and the correct information (e.g., screwdriver), and the 
misinformation effect is said to have occurred when the misinformed condition accepts more 
misinformation than the control condition. On the “modified” final test, participants were asked 
to choose between the original event information (e.g., screwdriver) and a new piece of 
information (e.g., wrench). The idea was that if memory was impaired by the misinformation, 
then people should do more poorly even on a test where the misinformation was not an option.  
If misinformation destructively updates memory for the original item in storage, then it is 
hypothesized that the original event detail is no longer available for retrieval.  Therefore, on a 
modified recognition test, participants should do more poorly because the memory is no longer 
accessible.  With the exception of the modified final test, participants in these studies were tested 
in the same way that Loftus tested participants. The results showed that the misled condition did 





researchers claimed that the memory of the original event was not impaired by misleading 
postevent information.  
 Ceci, Ross, and Toglia (1987; Experiments 3 and 4) tested whether misinformation could 
affect children’s memory using a) the traditional misinformation paradigm and b) the modified 
final test (Loftus, 1975; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). As expected, the misinformation effect 
was found using the traditional misinformation paradigm; however, somewhat surprisingly, the 
misinformation effect was also found using the modified final test. Belli (1989) also conducted a 
misinformation experiment, this time using a yes/no recognition test instead of a forced choice 
recognition test, which controlled for McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985)’s concern about response 
bias. On the yes/no recognition test, participants were presented with items and instructed to say 
“yes” when the items were presented in the original event and “no” if they were not. There were 
three types of items on this test: a) targets, items that were presented at study, b) postevent 
information, false information presented after the original event, and c) novel information that 
was not mentioned during or after the event. Belli (1989) found that when misinformation was 
introduced, the recognition of items from the original event decreased. This finding provided 
evidence that postevent information interferes with or impairs the memory for the original event. 
Tversky and Tuchin (1989) conducted a similar study using a yes/no recognition test. The 
researchers’ found that participants performed worse on items for which they were misled about 
in comparison to items they were not. The researchers took these findings as evidence that 
misleading information affects the memory of the original information. However, participants in 
this study sometimes accepted both the original information and postevent information, which 





Windschitl, McCarthy, and Winfrey (1992) found memory impairments on the modified test 
after a long retention interval (5-7 days) but not a short retention interval (15 minutes).  
Lindsay and Johnson (1987) proposed that misinformation may be accepted because 
people incorrectly attribute misinformation as having occurred in the original event. They called 
this misattribution a source monitoring error. A source monitoring error is committed when 
participants remember the original event information and the postevent information but confuse 
the sources, leading them to report that the postevent information occurred in the original event 
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsey, 1993; Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
Zaragoza and Lane (1994) sought to determine whether people actually confuse 
postevent information with their memories of the original event. To test this, participants were 
asked to make overt source judgments on the final test. Additive postevent information was used 
in order to reduce the chances of participants detecting discrepancies between the original and 
the postevent information. Participants were instructed to indicate whether they “saw”, “read” or 
“both” saw and read about an item. Some participants indicated that they “saw” the postevent 
information in the original event. This finding provides evidence that participants believed that 
postevent information was shown in the original event.  
Loftus and Hoffman (1989) stated that misinformation acceptance and memory 
impairment are both involved in accepting misinformation. They discussed how misinformation 
acceptance, memory impairment, and source misattribution can all lead participants to report 
misinformation. The researchers continued to uphold the claim that memory impairment can and 
does occur while embracing the idea that misinformation acceptance plays a role in the 





the following theories: misinformation acceptance, memory impairment, and source 
misattribution. It is possible that within a study or paradigm that all three of these types of 
misinformation acceptances could occur. For instance, a participant could have seen a man drink 
a Coke in a video but received postevent information that the man drank Pepsi. On the final test, 
he or she could be confused as to whether they saw Pepsi or Coke in the video. Another 
participant may recall the source of both the Coke and Pepsi but think that the experimenter who 
provided the postevent information is more likely to know what happened. This may lead the 
participant to report that the man drank a Pepsi in the video. Finally, another participant’s 
memory for the video may have been impaired by encountering the postevent information about 
the man drinking a Pepsi.  
Summary: What leads to the acceptance of misinformation?  
 During the memory impairment debate, researchers found several causes of the 
misinformation effect. These causes fall into three broad categories: memory impairment, 
misinformation acceptance, and response bias. One cause of choosing misinformation on a final 
test occurs when a person is exposed to postevent information and it leads to the impairment of 
memory for the original event (Loftus, 1979; Loftus & Loftus, 1980). This phenomenon has been 
called memory impairment. Lindsay and Johnson (1987, 1989) discovered another cause for 
accepting misinformation which is known as source monitoring errors. Source monitoring errors 
are a form of memory impairment that occur when a person remembers both the original event 
and misinformation, but remembers the misinformation as having occurred during the original 
event. Misinformation acceptance occurs when participants who remember both sources of 
information choose the postevent information. Another form of misinformation acceptance 





remember the original information but does remember the postevent information.  Lastly, in 
some cases the participant may forget both the original event and the misinformation in which 
case they resort to guessing.  
What leads to the rejection of false information?  
 There are three main reasons why participants would reject misinformation. One reason a 
participant may reject misinformation is because he or she remembers the original event 
information, the postevent information, and their respective sources. Rejecting misinformation in 
this fashion is akin to recollection rejection. Next, a person may be led to reject misinformation 
because he or she remembers the original information and forgets the postevent information. 
Finally, the person may forget both the original information and the postevent information and 
make a guess.  
Strategies Used to Discern True From False Information 
There are a number of strategies that can be used to accept or reject information. 
Tousignant, Hall, and Loftus (1986; Loftus, 1992) suggest discrepancy detection is one 
mechanism used to accept or reject misinformation. Discrepancy detection occurs when a 
participant detects a discrepancy between the original event and the postevent information at the 
time the postevent information is encountered. When a person encounters information about a 
witnessed event, they use discrepancy detection to identify differences between what they 
remember witnessing and the information being provided to them. The quality of a person’s 
memory affects their ability to use discrepancy detection (Tousignant et al., 1986). If a person 
cannot remember an event well, they will struggle to detect differences between what they 





compare the new information to. The discrepancy detection principle states that “recollections 
are more likely to change if a person does not immediately detect discrepancies between 
postevent information and memory for the original event” (Loftus, 1992; p121). As a result, 
discrepancies between the two sources are less likely to be detected when original event 
information and postevent information are spread apart further in time. Tousignant et al. (1986) 
sought to provide direct evidence for the use of discrepancy detection in the misinformation 
paradigm. They believed that discrepancy detection could explain people’s responses to 
warnings, delays in misinformation, and the strength of misinformation. To test for evidence of 
discrepancy detection in Experiment 1, the researchers measured how quickly participants read 
postevent information. The researchers hypothesized that if a discrepancy was detected, 
participants would read or think over the postevent information, taking more time to come to a 
resolution of what they witnessed. In Experiment 2, discrepancy detection was directly measured 
by asking participants to report when they detected a discrepancy in addition to measuring 
reading speed (Tousignant et al., 1986). Slower reading times were found to be associated with 
reduced acceptance of false information. It follows that quicker reading times were associated 
with higher acceptance rates of false information. In another experiment, reading speed was 
experimentally manipulated by instructing participants to read the postevent information quickly 
or slowly. This was done in order to confirm that slower reading times, not people prone to slow 
reading, were associated with a decrease in the acceptance of misinformation (Tousignant et al., 
1986). These studies confirmed that slower reading times were associated with higher levels of 
discrepancy detection and accuracy. Other research found that participants whose attention is 
divided during the encoding of postevent information are more likely to report misinformation 





studies provided evidence that the resources necessary to detect discrepancies between two 
sources of information are not available to participants who are distracted.  
Another strategy that may be used to accept or reject misinformation is recollection 
rejection. Recollection rejection is a memory editing strategy that reduces rates of false 
recognition (Brainerd et al., 2003) through comparing possible events when only one could have 
actually occurred. When one of these events is recognized, the others can be rejected. For 
example, if a person can remember parking their car in the parking lot at work they can reject the 
idea that they took a bus or a place to work because it is only possible to take one of mode of 
transportation.  
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists have been used to examine recollection rejection 
(Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). The DRM paradigm consists of lists of words that 
all relate to one critical unpresented word, which is known as a critical lure. For example, one list 
consists of words related to royalty. Royalty is the critical lure so it is not presented at study but a 
number of people recall it at test because it is so similar to the other words they have studied.  
When recollection rejection occurs in the context of the DRM paradigm, people compare their 
memory for one word (i.e., king) to other related words (i.e., princess, royalty, etc.).   
There are a number of findings to support the idea that people are more likely to falsely 
accept a related item that was not presented at study than an unrelated item that was not 
presented at study (Roediger & McDermott, 1995). When people’s memory of the DRM lists is 
tested, they accept the critical lure as part of the studied word list at very high rates (Lampinen, 
Meier, Anal, & Leding, 2005; Lampinen, Odegard, Blackshear, & Toglia, 2005). In addition to 
strong evidence for these findings, researchers have found that under certain circumstances 





& Kneer, 1995). These findings have been explained by the use of recollection rejection, which 
allows people to compare related items or events in memory to determine what happened. If 
someone can remember that the word horse (target) was presented, they can be more confident 
that the word pony (related lure) was not presented, whereas they would be less confident that 
pony was not presented if they did not remember the word horse. If someone is asked if the word 
cup (unrelated lure) was presented but they have no recollection of another related word (i.e., 
glass), they may say “it’s possible that the word cup was presented, because I do not recall a 
related word being presented.”  Recollection rejection has been thoroughly investigated using 
words, pictures, and statements; however, no research has examined whether people can use 
recollection rejection to reject false postevent information like that used in the misinformation 
paradigm (Gallo, Bell, Beier, & Scharcter, 2006; Reyna & Kiernan, 1995). There are a number 
of ways studies have measured recollection rejection. I thought that using receiver operating 
characteristics to measure recollection rejection was a fitting choice for the misinformation 
paradigm.   
Directly Measuring Recollection Rejection 
ROC Curves 
Receiver operator characteristic curves are scatterplots of the proportion of correct 
recognitions and the proportion of false recognitions at varying confidence levels (Yonelinas, 
1997). These values are obtained through old/new recognition tests. An “old” judgment indicates 
the belief that an item was studied; a “new” judgment indicates the belief that an item was not 
studied.  On the x-axis, the probability of accepting an item that was not studied (unrelated items 





axis, the probability of accepting targets at various confidence levels is plotted. The furthest 
point on the left of the graph shows the rate at which the most confidently remembered items, old 
(on the y axis) and new (on the x axis) are accepted as “sure-old”. The next point, “maybe-old” 
includes the rate at which old and new items are accepted as “sure-old” and “maybe-old”. This 
continues until the final point, “sure-new” which incorporates the rate at which old and new 
items are accepted as “sure-new” and all of the other possible judgments. The point on the y-
intercept that the curve intersects represents “sure-old” the amount of recollection occurring 
because at this point, signal detection process is maximally conservative (Lampinen et al., 2005). 
When the upper x-intercept of the “old-similar” (related lure) data is higher than the upper x-
intercept of the “old-new” (unrelated lure) data, recollection rejection has occurred. The 
difference between these two numbers provides a measure of how much recollection rejection is 
occurring. The symmetry of ROC curves contributes to their ability to provide a measure of 
recollection rejection. When only familiarity processes account for recognition decisions and the 
distribution of recognition is normal and of equal variance, symmetrical ROCs will occur 
(Brainerd et al. 2003). Yonelinas (1994) found that these plots are skewed when measuring 
recognition; this occurs when distributions of familiarity values are not normal or have unequal 
variances.  
Rotello, Macmillian, and Van Tassel (2000) demonstrated that (ROC) curves are useful 
in determining the use of recollection rejection in recognition tasks, assuming a dual-process 
model of recognition. The researchers propose a model of recognition involving both familiarity 
and recollection. In such cases, the y-intercept of the ROC curve will be greater than zero and the 
slope will be decreasing. The decreasing slope is due to the distribution of familiarity. When 





2000). Rotello et al. (2000) argued that recollection rejection occurs when distractors are placed 
in the “sure-new” category and no old items are placed into the “sure-new” category. This causes 
the ROC curve to hit the upper x-axis when the false alarm rate is less than 1. The researchers 




 In a series of experiments, Lampinen, Odegard, Blackshear, and Toglia (2005) tested 
whether ROC curves would show evidence for recollection rejection by presenting participants 
with a list of words. Participants were tested over their memory for words that were presented, 
related words that were not presented, and unrelated words that were not presented. When target 
recognition was regressed onto false recognition for related words, they found the upper x-
intercept to be about .71 which indicates that about 29% of the related words were rejected by 
recollection rejection.  
Figure One: Hypothetical ROC curve that 










A phantom ROC model was devised to examine phantom recollection and recollection 
rejection using ROC curves (Lampinen et al., 2005). Phantom recollection is a phenomenon that 
occurs when a person experiences a false recognition as compellingly as he or she experiences 
true memories. When phantom recollection occurs, it can lead to erroneous recollection 
rejection, which is the rejection of a target item. The phantom ROC model retains some of the 
assumptions of Brainerd, Wright, Reyna, and Mojardin (2001) phantom recollection model and 
Yonelinas (1999) dual process model. Lampinen et al. (2005) assumed that familiarity is not an 
all-or-none, but a graded process like Yonelinas. Yonelinas used ROC curves to model 
recollection and familiarity (1994; 1997). The phantom ROC model builds off of this by using 
ROC curves to estimate additional memory processes influenced by recollection and familiarity 
(e.g., recollection rejection and phantom recollection). 
The phantom ROC model uses ROC plots of target recognition against related lures and 
unrelated lures like Rotello et al. (2000), to examine recollection rejection. The phantom ROC 
model adds the measurement of phantom recollection and phantom recollection rejection to form 
a complete model. Brainerd et al. (2001) also accounted for phantom recollection and phantom 
recollection rejection but instead used a conjoint recognition model.  
The phantom ROC model measures two high confidence, all-or-none processes: 
recollection rejection and phantom recollection. Finally, familiarity for targets and familiarity for 







Table 1. Parameters estimated by the phantom ROC model. 
Parameter Description 
Rt:  Recollection of targets 
ER t: Phantom recollection rejection for targets 
d’ t: Memory strength for targets based on familiarity 
P r: Phantom recollection for related lures 
R r  : Recollection rejection for related lures 
d’ r  : Memory strength for related lures based on familiarity 
 
Related Lures in the Phantom ROC model.  
There are a number of reasons a participant may accept or reject a related lure. If the 
participant uses recollection rejection, he or she will reject a related lure because they remember 
an item that disqualifies the related lure from having occurred. If phantom recollection occurs, 
the participant will accept the related lure on the basis that they believe that the target did not 
occur. Finally, a participant may accept a related lure because the item is familiar to the 
participant.  The probability of these different memory processes is estimated by the phantom 
recollection model by fitting a multinomial model. Phantom recollection and recollection 
rejection are estimated by fitting an ROC curve that plots cumulative recognition of related lures 
against cumulative recognition of unrelated lures. Familiarity for related lures is expressed in 
terms of the sensitivity (i.e., d’ r) of the underlying signal detection model.  
The equations for the related lure ROC curve are as follows, where cj refers to the 





P(related) = (1- R r ) P r + (1- R r ) (1- P r) Ø(d’ r - Cj ) 
P(unrelated) = Ø(- Cj ) 
Figure 2 is a hypothetical ROC curve using the phantom ROC model (Lampinen et al., 
2005). The equations for related and unrelated lures indicate that the signal detection process 
only comes into play if both recollection rejection and phantom recollection rejection fail to 
occur. When the signal detection process is maximally conservative, the equations are the 
following:  
P(related) = (1- R r) P r 
P(unrelated) = 0 
When the signal detection process is maximally conservative, the y-intercept in the model 
is (1-Rr)P r. One assumption of the phantom ROC model is that recollection rejection overpowers 
phantom recollection. Therefore, the y-intercept represents the probability of phantom 
recollection occurring.  
 If the response criterion is more liberal, the ROC curve should cross the diagonal 
representing chance performance and therefore should intercept below (1,1) on the curve. When 
signal detection is maximally liberal, the equations simplify to:  
P(unrelated)=1 
P(related)= Ø(d’ r - Cj ) 
If any recollection rejection occurs, the ROC curves should cross the diagonal and 
intercept somewhere below (1,1). Recollection rejection can be estimated by determining how 







Target recognition in the Phantom ROC model. 
Recollections occur when a participant accepts targets because they match the 
participants' exact memory trace. Targets can also be accepted because they are familiar. 
Participants can mistakenly reject a target because they “remember” the related lure as having 
occurred, as in the case of phantom recollection.  
Recollection, phantom recollection, and familiarity are all estimated from the ROC curve. 
Familiarity for targets is expressed in terms of the sensitivity (i.e., d’ t) of the underlying signal 
detection model.  
The equations for the ROC curve for target recognition are: 
P(target) = Rt + (1 - Rt)(1 - ER t) Ø(d’ t - Cj ) 
Figure Two: Hypothetical ROC Curve Illustrating 









P(unrelated) = Ø(- Cj ) 
Recollection estimates are provided by the y-intercept of the ROC curve. 
P(target) = Rt 
P(unrelated) = 1 
Thus, phantom recollection will only occur if a recollection does not occur according to 
the phantom recollection model.  
In Experiment 1, Lampinen et al. (2005) tested Brainerd’s et al. (2001) prediction that 
phantom recollection would be more likely to occur when the related lure is a good match for the 
underlying gist memory trace of the target. Phantom recollection for critical lures and missing 
exemplars were compared because when an item is closely related to the gist traces for the target, 
such as critical lures, phantom recollection should be higher in comparison to when an item is 
less closely related to the gist trace for the target, such as missing exemplars. In the DRM 
paradigm, critical lures are words that all of the presented words are related to. The critical lure 
is a word that is not presented at study but represents the gist of the word list. Missing exemplars 
are words that are not presented on the study lists; however, these words were generated to be 
related to critical lures but are not related to the whole list of words. Therefore, missing 
exemplars are less closely related to the list than the critical lures.  
In this experiment, participants studied multiple DRM lists. After the study phase, they 
took an old/new recognition test and ranked the confidence of their responses on a 4 point scale 
ranging from “not at all confident” to “extremely confident”.  To make these yes/no judgments, 





related instructions (Brainerd et al., 2001). Additionally, half of participants were asked to make 
remember/know responses for each item. Remember judgments map onto recollection while 
know judgments map onto familiarity. For “new” judgments, participants were asked to indicate 
“remember” if they could remember information that made them believe that the item was not 
presented during the study phase. 
As predicted, phantom recollection of critical lures was higher than the phantom 
recollection of missing exemplars. This occurred because critical lures provided a stronger cue 
for target items than missing exemplars.  ROC analyses found that remember-based responses 
were more common for targets than critical lures. The remember/know judgments which were 
considered as support for self-reported recollection rejection did not match up with ROC 
estimates of recollection rejection. The researchers hypothesize that this occurred because the 
instructions for the task may not have been clear enough.  
 In Experiment 2, study list length was varied in order to manipulate gist strength. It has 
been hypothesized that longer lists are more likely to induce gist representations (Brainerd et al., 
2001). The method in this experiment was the same as that in Experiment 1.  
The phantom recollection rejection of targets did not differ from recollection rejection of 
critical lures. Performance differences for target recognition, phantom recollection rejection, and 
recollection rejection were not found between list lengths. It was predicted that long lists would 
cause greater similarity for targets and critical lures, but this result was not found.  
Regarding false memories, the researchers found that ROC curves that plot related lures 
against unrelated lures intercepted the Y-axis above 0. This occurrence provides evidence for 





trace is strong, phantom recollection will occur. In Experiment 1, this was evidenced by the 
greater y-intercept for critical lures than missing exemplars. In Experiment 2, this was evidenced 
by the greater y-intercept for long list lures compared to short list lures.  
The use of the phantom ROC model to measure recollection rejection and other memory 
editing processes has several benefits. The phantom ROC model is able to measure the 
parameters of the model with the use of only one instructional condition. Brainerd et al.’s (2001) 
conjoint recognition model of phantom recollection requires three different instructional 
conditions and therefore more participants to obtain the same estimates. Additionally, the 
phantom ROC model clearly predicts that if any recollection rejection is occurring, the ROC 
curves should cross the diagonal and intercept somewhere below (1,1) (Lampinen et al. 2005). 
Additionally, the rate of recollection rejection is provided by the amount below (1,1) that the 
ROC curve falls.  
Lampinen, Watkins, and Odegard (2006) examined dual process predictions about 
recollection rejection using the phantom ROC model (three process model). Participants studied 
and were tested over their memory for pictures. On the test, there were targets, related lures, and 
unrelated lures. Targets were pictures that were presented during study, related lures were 
pictures of the target items taken at a different angle, and unrelated lures were pictures that are 
unrelated to targets and were not presented during study. The test included instructions that were 
similar to the conjoint recognition model’s test instructions. The first set of instructions was 
designed to elicit gist memory and the second set of instructions was designed to elicit verbatim 
memory. In the first set of instructions, the “meaning question” instructed participants to say 
‘yes’ if they saw the item in the study phase even if at study it was at a different angle (i.e., a 





participants were asked to respond ‘yes’ only if they saw the exact photo on the “standard 
recognition question”. Confidence ratings for the responses to both question types were obtained. 
In addition, attention was manipulated in order to determine its effect on recollection rejection 
rates. Half of participants were assigned to the divided attention condition. These participants 
were asked to count backwards by 3s during the study phase.  The other half of participants 
completed the study phase without any distractions.  
The researchers had three specific predictions. One prediction was that related lure ROC 
curves would be deflected below the diagonal when substantial recollection rejection occurred. 
This should occur because recollection rejection can provide a more certain basis for rejecting an 
item than a lack of familiarity. Target recognition, familiarity, and erroneous recollection 
rejection were estimated by ROC curves in which targets and unrelated lure probabilities were 
plotted. When meaning instructions were given, it was predicted that related items would be 
accepted; however, when standard instructions were given, it was predicted that they would be 
rejected. This prediction is based on the findings that recollection leads to the acceptance of 
related items under gist instructions but not under verbatim instructions. Finally, it was 
hypothesized that high confidence flip flops would occur if participants were asked both standard 
and meaning questions for the same item. High confidence flip flops occur when the high 
confidence rejection of related lures under one set of instructions (standard) becomes high 
confidence acceptances of those same items under the opposite set of instructions (meaning).  
ROC curves for related lures were deflected below the diagonal as predicted, indicating 
that substantial recollection rejection occurred. There was less of a downward deflection on the 
target ROC curve, which provides evidence that recollection rejection of related lures was more 





was much lower for participants who were distracted than for participants who were not. 
Participants who were distracted at study therefore made fewer recollection-based acceptances 
than participants who were not distracted. High confidence flip flops occurred more often for 
related lures than targets or unrelated lures. The data on high confidence flips flops indicate that 
there was a lot of recollection rejection of related lures. The data also show the erroneous 
recollection rejection of targets by participants. 
 In Experiment 2, half of participants were informed that the photos were mutually 
exclusive, while the other half of participants were told that it was possible to have seen pictures 
from two different camera angles (i.e., the items were not exclusive). Instructions about 
exclusivity were manipulated because using recollection rejection should be easier when a 
participant is alerted to the exclusive nature of items.  
For the standard instruction ROC curve, there was a downward deflection of both the 
mutually exclusive curve and the non-exclusive curve. This indicates that all participants used 
recollection rejection to accept targets and reject related lures. Erroneous recollection rejection of 
targets did not occur as often as recollection rejection, evidenced by the fact that the target 
standard instruction ROC curve did not have much of a downward deflection. Similar to the 
results found in experiment one, high confidence flip flops were more common for related lures 
than for targets, which were more common than unrelated lures. Mutual exclusivity instructions 
did not seem to have an effect on participants’ judgments. Lampinen et al. (2006) proposed that 
the instructions may not have affected participants’ choices because participants are already very 
capable of using recollection rejection without instructions. Alternatively, other researchers have 
proposed that recollection rejection may be unconscious and therefore unaffected by 





curves would be reflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection occurs. As predicted, 
recollection caused people to be confident that some proportion of the related lures were not 
presented during the study. This is what causes the ROC curve to be reflected below the 
diagonal. The ROC curve was lower on the right side when using standard instructions and 
higher when using the meaning instructions. This is due to the fact that acceptance of related 
lures occurred under meaning instructions but was rejected under standard instructions. Both 
experiments provided evidence for the prediction that high confidence flip flops would occur for 
related lures. Phantom ROC, a three process model, closely follows the findings and predictions 
of the two process models discussed above. The new component that this model added to the 
dual process models (conjoint recognition and ROC) is the measurement of phantom recollection 
using ROC curves.  
In the current studies, I examined the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation 
paradigm. The goal of these studies was to determine if and how recollection rejection is used a) 
when someone has witnessed a crime and b) when he or she received false information (related 
and unrelated to the event) about the crime. This research has important implications for 
determining how often recollection rejection is used in real life scenarios.   
Pilot Study 
Hypothesis One: The acceptance of additive misinformation should be higher than the 
acceptance of contradictory misinformation because people can use recollection rejection to 





Hypothesis Two: People will report using recollection rejection less than the other 
measures (e.g., pROC curves, contradictory vs. additive misinformation) because recollection 
rejection is not always a conscious process.   
Methods 
Participants 
One hundred and thirty-six general psychology students from the University of Arkansas 
participated for course credit. Participants who indicated they knew the true nature of the study 
were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally knew the person in the slide show 
were excluded from analyses. Fourteen participants indicated knowledge about the study or 
recognized the subject of the slide show. Therefore, one hundred and twenty-two participants’ 
data were analyzed. The sample was predominately Caucasian (90.2%, 4.92% African American, 
1.64% Hispanic, 1.64% Asian, 1.64% Bi-racial), and 63% female, and the average age was 19.22 
years (SD=1.61, Range=18-27).  
Design 
The study manipulated item type (e.g., foil, additive, contradictory) in order to establish 
misinformation effects for both contradictory and additive item types.  
Materials 
Participants viewed a slide show of a handy man snooping around a client’s house while 
the client is away, similar to materials created by Takarangi, Parker, and Garry (2006). Three 
different versions of the slide show were constructed. There were a total of nine critical items 





as each item type in one of the slide shows. A narrative about each slide show was constructed.  
The narrative detailed all of the events that occurred in the slide show. Additive items were items 
that were not shown in the slide shows but were mentioned in the text. Therefore, additive items 
were misinformation items that were presented only in the narrative. Contradictory items were 
items in the narrative that contradicted the footage in the slide show. For example, the man was 
shown drinking a Pepsi in the slide show but in the narrative it is suggested that he drank a Coca-
Cola. Unrelated items were items that were not shown in the slide show or mentioned in the 
narrative, but were asked about on a final test. There were also true and false filler items on the 
final test. The final test was an old/new recognition judgment test. On the first page of the test, 
there were explicit instructions asking participants to respond according to what they saw in the 
slide show. When an item was viewed in the slide show, participants were instructed to indicate 
“yes”. When an item was not viewed in the slide show, participants were instructed to indicate 
“no”. The test consisted of 24 items: 15 fillers, 3 unrelated, 3 contradictory, and 3 additive items.  
In addition to indicating whether they saw the item in the slide show, participants were asked to 
rank their confidence in their responses. Confidence rankings were “extremely confident”, 
“moderately confident”, “somewhat confident”, and “not at all confident”. Self-report judgments 
were collected from participants by asking them to “explain your response” to each question. 
Lampinen, Odegard, and Neuschatz (2004) used this self-report method as an estimate of 
recollection rejection as well as other acceptance and rejection strategies.  
Procedure 
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory 
for normal everyday events. Participants consented to participate before the study began. First, 





task, participants read a narrative about the slide show that was “written by a police officer”. 
After this, participants took part in a 2 minute filler task. Participants then completed an old/new 
recognition test. Prior to recognition test administration, the experimenter instructed the 
participant on how to complete the test. 
Results 
Data Analysis 
 For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items, 
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded and analyzed using a one way repeated 
measures ANOVA. The confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit to the phantom 
ROC model using procedures outlined in Lampinen et al.  (2005). The model parameters were 
compared to the self-reported rates of recollection rejection. The self-report data was coded by 
two RAs in order to obtain an inter-rater reliability score. We chose Pearson’s r as a measure of 
correlation between our two coders.  Each self-report response was coded for recollection 
rejection, distinctiveness, discrepancy detection, video recall, narrative recall, guessing, 
familiarity, and memory. I was primarily interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of 
these studies, so those are the only self-report analyses reported in this manuscript.  
The purpose of this study was to learn about the use of recollection rejection in the 
misinformation paradigm. The results are divided into three sections: misinformation results, 
phantom ROC, and the self-report of recollection rejection. Unless otherwise specified, all 
results were considered significant at p<.05 (two-tailed).  
Misinformation Results. Accuracy rates for the critical items are presented in Figure 





contradictory) differed significantly, F (2, 270) =3.05, p=.05, ɳ
2
p = .022. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that unrelated item accuracy (M=.86, SD=.24) was significantly higher than additive 
item accuracy (M=.67, SD=.35) and contradictory item accuracy (M=.73, SD=.32), p’s <.001.   
 I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than 
contradictory misinformation acceptance. Contradictory misinformation is exclusive from a 
corresponding piece of original information (i.e., Coke vs. Pepsi) but additive misinformation is 
not exclusive. Therefore, people should be able to use recollection rejection to reject 
contradictory misinformation but not additive misinformation. Consistent with this hypothesis, 
pairwise comparisons revealed that accuracy on contradictory items (M=.73, SD=.32) was higher 
than accuracy on additive items (M=.67, SD=.35), p=.035. 
 
Phantom ROC. The data was analyzed by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC 
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas (1997) and Lampinen et al. (2005), we used the Solver 
add-in to Excel to obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated 





the model are shown in Table 2. Overall, the model provided an excellent fit, accounting for 
99.997% of the variance.  
For additive items, estimates of recollection rejection were approximately 6% and 
estimates of phantom recollection were at 14%. For contradictory items, estimates of recollection 
rejection were at 42% and estimates of phantom recollection were at 26%.  
 






Additive Items Contradictory Items 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR PhR d' RR PhR d' 
6.41 1.47 1.17 1.03 0.75 0.13 -0.54 0.06 0.14 0.28 0.42 0.25 0.48 
 
Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the 
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=.68, SD=.7) 





r(136)=.55, p<.001. On contradictory items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.64, SD=.92) and 
RA2 (M=1.58, SD=.93) was r(136)=.86, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1 
(M=.47, SD=.6) and RA2 (M=.35, SD=.55) was r(136)=.64, p<.001. 
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 55%. The self-
reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 15%. The self-reported rate of 
recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.  
A one way ANOVA was conducted to determine the differences in self-reported 
recollection rejection by item type. The main effect of item type was significant, F (2, 242) 
=108.48, p<.001, ɳ
2
p = .473. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants self-reported 
recollection rejection more on contradictory items (M= .55, SE=.03) than additive (M=.15, SE= 
.02) or unrelated items (M=.18, SE=.02), p’s<.001.  
Discussion 
In this study, I examined the use of recollection rejection in an ecologically valid way 
using the misinformation paradigm. The goals of this study were to a) establish whether our 
materials would replicate the effects of previous misinformation research and b) determine if or 
to what extent people use recollection rejection to reject event-based suggestions. I found support 
for the use of recollection rejection through the three methods used to measure it in the 
misinformation paradigm.  
 A misinformation effect was found for both the contradictory and additive 
misinformation. Consistent with my hypothesis, I found that additive misinformation was 
accepted more than contradictory misinformation. Evidence for this hypothesis also came from 





contradictory items indicated the recollection rejection occurred 42% of the time. In comparison, 
recollection rejection for additive items occurred 6% of the time.  
I expected that the self-reported rates of recollection rejection may be lower than the 
other measures of recollection rejection indicated. This was not the case. The self-reported rate 
of recollection rejection was 54% for the contradictory items. In comparison, the estimate of 
recollection rejection of the contradictory items by the phantom ROC model was 43%. Although 
these differences are likely not significantly different, the rate of self-reported recollection 
rejection was definitely not lower than the other estimates. Perhaps using recollection rejection to 
reject items encountered in the environment (i.e., narrative) is more overt and conscious than 
rejecting items such as words.  
Experiment One: Delay Study 
Hypothesis 1: Participants who receive shorter delays will accept less postevent 
information than participants with longer delays. 
Hypothesis 2: Participants who receive shorter delays will be more likely to use 
recollection rejection than participants who receive longer delays.  
 Due to the fact that there are mixed findings on delay times in misinformation studies, it 
is important to test the effects of manipulating delay times on the acceptance of the two types of 
misinformation and the use of recollection rejection. Using recollection rejection should be 
easier with short retention intervals because participants have to remember the original event 
information and postevent information for less time. Additionally, I am interested in the effects 
of manipulating delay time on the acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation. 





contradictory misinformation (Nemeth & Belli, 2006), whereas research using long delays has 
found that contradictory misinformation is accepted less often than additive misinformation 
(Frost, 2000). This may be because additive misinformation is especially distinctive immediately 
after viewing the original event. However, it should also be easier to use recollection rejection 
immediately after viewing the original event.  
Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and thirty-nine general psychology students from the University of 
Arkansas participated for course credit. Participants who indicated that they knew that the study 
was about the misinformation effect were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally 
knew the subject of the slide show were excluded from analyses. Thirteen participants indicated 
knowledge about the study or recognized the subject of the slide show. Two hundred and twenty-
six participants were included for analyses.  The sample was predominately Caucasian (84.1%, 
6.19% African American, 2.65% Hispanic, 3.54% Asian, 2.21% Native American, .04% Bi-
racial, 1.32% unreported), 62.4% female, and the average age was 19.17 years (SD=1.29, 
Range=18-29). 
Design 
The study was a 3 (item type: foil, additive, contradictory) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x 
2 (second delay: short, long) mixed factorial design with delay lengths as between subjects 







Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory 
for normal everyday events. Participants consented to participate before the study began. First, 
participants viewed a slide show then they took part in a 2 (short) or 14 (long) minute filler task. 
After the filler task, participants read a narrative about the slide show that was “written by a 
police officer”. After this, participants took part in another 2 (short) or 14 (long) minute filler 
task. Participants then completed an old/new recognition test. Prior to recognition test 
administration, the experimenter instructed the participant on how to complete the test.  
Results 
Data Analysis 
For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items, 
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded and analyzed using a 3 (critical items: 
unrelated items, contradictory items, and additive items) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x 2 (second 
delay: short, long) ANOVA to determine the effects of item type and differing delay lengths. The 
confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit to the phantom ROC model. The model 
was compared to the self-report data. According to dual process theory, the ROC curves will be 
deflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection is occurring. Since recollection 
rejection can be used for contradictory misinformation, I expected the ROC curve to be deflected 
below the diagonal for the contradictory items. Since recollection rejection cannot be used for 
additive misinformation I did not expect the ROC curve to be deflected below the diagonal for 





score. I was primarily interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of these studies so 
those are the only self-report analyses reported in this manuscript. 
The purpose of this study was to learn about the effect of delays on use of recollection 
rejection in the misinformation paradigm. The results are divided into three sections: 
misinformation results, phantom ROC, and the self-report of recollection rejection. Unless 
otherwise specified, all results were considered significant at p<.05 (two-tailed).  
Misinformation Results. Data from the misinformation results are presented in Figure 5. 
In order to analyze misinformation effects and the effects of delays a 3 (item: unrelated, 
contradictory, additive) x 2 (first delay: short, long) x 2 (second delay: short, long) ANOVA was 
conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item type, F (2, 442) = 42.26, p<.001, ɳ
2
p = 
.16. Pairwise comparisons revealed that unrelated item accuracy (M=.84, SD=.24) was 
significantly higher than additive item accuracy (M=.61, SD=.35) and contradictory item 
accuracy (M=.75, SD=.29), p’s<.001.  
 I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than 
contradictory misinformation acceptance because contradictory items are more conducive to the 
use of recollection rejection. Pairwise comparisons revealed that contradictory item accuracy 
(M=.75, SD=.29) was significantly higher than additive item accuracy (M=.61, SD=.35),  p<.001, 
providing evidence for my hypothesis. 
 The ANOVA revealed no effect of delay one on accuracy, F(1, 221)= .63, p=.43, ɳ
2
p = 
.003, no effect of delay two on accuracy, F(1, 221)= .35, p=.56, ɳ
2
p = .002, no interaction 
between delay one and delay two, F(1, 221)= .58, p=.45, ɳ
2
p = .003,  no interaction between 
delay one and item type, F(2, 442)=1.47, p=.23, ɳ
2





item type, F(2, 442)=.34, p=.71, ɳ
2
p = .002,  and no three way interaction between item type, 
delay one, and delay two, F(6, 442)= .3, p=.74, ɳ
2
p = .001.  
 There were no group differences in the misinformation effects for contradictory or 
additive misinformation items.  
 
Phantom ROC. We analyzed the data by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC 
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas and Lampinen, we used the Solver add-in to Excel to 
obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated with the model.  
The best fitting ROC curves are shown in Figures 6-9 and parameter estimates for the model are 
shown in Table 3. Overall, the models provided an excellent fit, accounting for 99.4% of the 
variance for the long-long condition, 99.8% of the variance for the long-short condition, 99.2% 
of the variance for the short-long condition, and 99.8% of the variance for the short-short 





Short-Short Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 
2% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 16% of the time. For 
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 40% of the time and phantom 
recollection was used 21% of the time.  
Short-Long Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 
7% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 16% of the time. For 
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 35% of the time and phantom 
recollection was used 17% of the time. 
Long-Short Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 
0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. For 
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 40% of the time and phantom 
recollection was used 15% of the time. 
Long-Long Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 
0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. For 
contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 48% of the time and phantom 
recollection was used 15% of the time. 
Overall. For additive items, recollection rejection rates did not differ across conditions 
but phantom recollection rates decreased when the first delay was long (0%, 0%) instead of short 
(16%, 16%). For contradictory items, recollection rejection rates were highest in the longest 
delay condition, long-long, and lowest in the short-long delay condition. For contradictory items, 




















Table Three.  
Parameters Additive Items Contradictory Items 
Short-Short   
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
4.43 1.47 1.01 0.89 0.66 0.15 -0.42 0.01 0.16 0.29 0.40 0.21 0.11 
Short-Long   
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
5.48 1.43 1.14 1.03 0.69 0.22 -0.34 0.06 0.16 0.57 0.35 0.17 0 
Long-Short   
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
1.84 1.36 1 0.91 0.64 0.13 -0.57 0 0.08 0.38 0.41 0.15 0.47 
Long-Long   
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
1.51 1.12 0.84 0.78 0.62 0.11 -0.34 0 0 0.49 0.48 0.15 0.5 
 
Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the 
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=2.63, 
SD=1.43) and RA2 (M=2.85, SD=1.49) was r(239) = .90, p<.001. On unrelated items, the 
agreement between RA1 (M=.48, SD=.65) and RA2 (M=.61, SD=.75) was r(239)=.83, p<.001. 
On contradictory items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.69, SD=.96) and RA2 (M=1.72, 
SD=.97) was r(239)=.94, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1 (M=.46, 
SD=.67) and RA2 (M=.52, SD=.67) was r(239)=.89, p<.001.  
Short-Short Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 61%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 19%. The 
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 17%.  
Short-Long Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 64%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The 





Long-Short Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 16%. The 
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 16%.  
Long-Long Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 9%. The 
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 20%.  
Overall. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 58%. 
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 15%. The self-reported rate 
of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.  
In order to determine the effects of item type and delay on self-reported rates of 
recollection rejection, a 3 (item: contradictory, additive, unrelated) x 2 (delay one: short, long) x 
2 (delay two: short, long) ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item 
type, F (2, 444) = 204.75, p<.001, ɳ
2
p = .48. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants 
reported using recollection rejection more for contradictory items (M=.58, SE=.02) than additive 
items (M=.15, SE=.01) and unrelated items (M=.18, SE=.02), p’s<.001. There was not a 
significant difference in self-reported recollection rejection for additive and unrelated items. 
There was a main effect of the first delay, F (1, 222) = 4.72, p=.031, ɳ
2
p = .02. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that participants whose first delay was short (M=.32, SE=.01) reported 
more recollection rejection than participants whose first delay was long (M=.38, SE=.02), 








In this study, I manipulated the delay that  participants received before and after they 
received misinformation. Misinformation effects were found for contradictory and additive 
misinformation item types, replicating the results found in the pilot study. The finding that 
additive misinformation was accepted more than contradictory misinformation was also 
replicated in this study.  
The main manipulation in this study, delay, was not significant. It was hypothesized that 
participants would be less accurate when delays were longer and that they would be less likely to 
use recollection rejection. Participants’ accuracy, however, did not vary with delays. One 
explanation for this is that the delays used were not long enough or different enough from one 
another. The experiment was constrained to a one hour time block, which constrained the longest 
delay times that we could use to two 14 minute delays. These delays seem relatively short in 
comparison to the delays in reporting a crime that may occur in real life (e.g., hours or days). In 
comparison, our short delay times were 2 minutes apiece. This means that the difference between 
the long-long delay condition and the short-short delay condition was 24 minutes. I thought that 
this time difference would be enough to elicit differences in accuracy scores, but this was not 
found to be true.  
Almost all research on the misinformation effect involves delays both before and after 
receiving postevent information. While the length of the delay period varies across studies, 
almost no one has directly examined the effects of manipulating delay on the acceptance of 
misinformation. Belli, Windschitl, McCarthy, and Winfry (1992) examined the effects of 





had a short delay (15 minutes) and a long delay (5-7 days). The researchers found that memory 
was more impaired when the test was delayed 5-7 days than when it was taken 15 minutes after 
receiving postevent information. Belli et al. (1992) did find an effect of delay but their delay 
manipulation was much stronger than ours. However, if we had manipulated the delay time 
across hours or days, I would expect that recollection rejection rates would decrease with a 
longer delay between postevent information and the test.   
Experiment Two: Warning Study  
 In many recollection rejection studies, instructions about the use of recollection rejection 
have been provided to participants (Brainerd et al., 2003). Instructing participants about the 
exclusivity of items and the ability to use recollection rejection approximately doubles the use of 
recollection rejection (Rotello et al. 2000).  In these studies, participants in the control condition 
who did not receive instructions used recollection rejection 13-14% of the time, whereas 
participants in the instruction condition used recollection rejection nearly 30% of the time.   
In most recollection rejection studies, words are presented and participants are tested over 
studied words, related words that were not studied, and unrelated words that were not studied. 
Instructions introducing recollection rejection are presented to alert participants to the fact that 
there are item categories or that original information is somewhat exclusive from the postevent 
information. For example, in the traditional recollection rejection studies, participants may know 
that they did not hear the word ‘ball’ if they saw a picture of a ‘ball’ because the experimenter 
informed them that the item would be presented either as a word or a picture. In the 
misinformation paradigm, there are two sources that a piece of information could have come 





piece of information from the original event, the participant may believe that the two pieces of 
information are exclusive (i.e., that the postevent information is wrong).   
Warnings have been used in misinformation studies to reduce the acceptance of false 
postevent information (Greene, Flynn, & Loftus, 1982; Tousignant et al. 1986; Christiaansen & 
Ochalek, 1983). Greene et al. (1982) warned participants of misinformation in an attempt to get 
them to resist accepting misinformation on a final test.  The researchers manipulated the 
placement of the warning: before the slides, before the postevent information, before the test, or 
no warning. In these misinformation warning studies, an explanation for why the source of the 
postevent information may be inaccurate is provided. In the first misinformation warning study, 
the researchers told participants that the police cadet who wrote the report “was inexperienced at 
detailing observed crimes, some of the information…may be inaccurate” (Greene et al. 1982; 
p.210). The researchers measured the time it took participants to read the postevent information 
as well as accuracy on the final memory test to assess the effect of the warnings. In comparison 
to people who did not receive a warning, people who received a warning between the event and 
the postevent information took longer to read sentences containing false information. People who 
received warnings immediately before the slides or immediately before the final test read 
sentences at the same rate as people who did not receive a warning. In Experiment 1, the 
researchers found that people warned before the postevent information were marginally more 
accurate on the final memory test than people who were not warned. A second experiment was 
conducted to replicate these findings. In the second study, warnings placed just before the 
postevent information led to significantly greater accuracy on the final memory test in 
comparison to people who did not receive a warning. This finding was later replicated by other 





used by Greene et al. (1982) and warnings used in other research did not restore memory 
performance to levels of the control group who received no false information.  
Warnings placed before the postevent information decrease the source monitoring and 
misinformation acceptance portions of the misinformation effect by increasing discrepancy 
detection. Therefore, successful recollection rejection rates should increase when participants are 
warned.  
I was interested in measuring the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation 
paradigm, so I tested the effects of a misinformation warning with specific instructions about 
recollection rejection on misinformation acceptance. Providing instructions to participants should 
alter peoples’ strategy, causing them to scrutinize postevent information more carefully, thereby 
increasing the chance that discrepancy detection will occur and recollection rejection will be 
used to reject false information.  
Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy-nine general psychology students from the University of 
Arkansas participated for course credit. Participants who indicated that they knew that the study 
was about the misinformation effect were excluded from analyses. Participants who personally 
knew the subject of the slide show were also excluded from analyses.  Five participants indicated 
knowledge about the study or recognized the subject of the slide show. This left us with one 
hundred and seventy-four participants.  The sample was predominately Caucasian (84.3%, 3.5% 
African American, 5.23% Hispanic, 6.98% Asian, 1.16% Bi-racial), 66.9% female, and the 






The study was a 3 (item type: foil, additive, contradictory) x 3 (warning: no warning, 
warning, warning + recollection rejection instructions) mixed factorial design with and warning 
as a between subjects factor. The materials for this study were the same as the materials for the 
pilot study with the addition of a warning.  
Procedure  
Participants were informed that they would be participating in a study examining memory 
for normal everyday events. Participants gave consent to participate before the study began. 
Participants were shown a slide show. Afterwards, participants completed a 14 minute filler task. 
Before reading a narrative about the slide show, participants in the warning conditions were 
warned about inaccurate details in the narrative. Participants were then given a narrative about 
the slide show to read that was “written by a police officer”. Once they finished reading the 
narrative, participants performed another 14 minute filler task. After the filler, participants in the 
warning condition were reminded of possibility of inaccurate details in the narrative. Participants 
in the warning and recollection rejection instruction condition received a description of 
recollection rejection as well as an example of how it could be used. Participants then completed 
an old/new recognition test. Prior to recognition test administration, the experimenter instructed 










For each participant, accuracy on the 3 types of critical items (unrelated items, 
contradictory items, and additive items) was coded. The data was analyzed using a 3 (critical 
items: unrelated items, contradictory items, and additive items) x 3 (warning: no warning, 
warning, warning and recollection rejection instructions) mixed factorial ANOVA to determine 
the effects of items type and warnings. The confidence-accuracy data for the critical items was fit 
using the phantom ROC model. Confidence data was plotted so that ROC curves could be fit to 
them. The model was compared to self-report data. According to dual process theory, the ROC 
curves should be deflected below the diagonal when recollection rejection is occurring. Since 
recollection rejection can be used for contradictory misinformation, we expected the ROC curve 
to be deflected below the diagonal for contradictory misinformation ROC curves. Since 
recollection rejection cannot be used for additive misinformation, we did not expect the ROC 
curve to be deflected below the diagonal for additive misinformation ROC curves. The self-
report data was coded by two RAs to obtain an inter-rater reliability score. I was primarily 
interested in recollection rejection for the purposes of these studies so those are the only self-
report analyses reported in this manuscript. 
Misinformation Effects. Data from the misinformation results are presented in Figure 10. 
In order to analyze misinformation effects and the effects of warnings, a 3 (item: unrelated, 
contradictory, additive) x 3 (warning: no warning, warning, warning + RR) ANOVA was 
conducted. The ANOVA on these scores revealed a main effect of item type, F (2, 340) = 16.74, 
p<.001, ɳ
2





higher than additive item accuracy, p<.001. This finding reveals that there was a misinformation 
effect for the additive misinformation. Pairwise comparisons revealed that unrelated item 
accuracy was significantly higher than contradictory item accuracy, p=.002. Therefore, there was 
a misinformation effect for both additive and contradictory items.   
 I hypothesized that additive misinformation acceptance would be higher than 
contradictory misinformation acceptance because contradictory items are more conducive to the 
use of recollection rejection  Pairwise comparisons revealed that contradictory item accuracy was 
significantly higher than additive item accuracy, p=.002. 
 The ANOVA revealed a main effect of warning on accuracy, F (2, 170) =3.38, p=.036, ɳ
2
p 
= .038 and an interaction between warning and item type, F (4, 340) =2.94, p=.027, ɳ
2
p =.033.  
Pairwise comparisons using LSD test revealed that the control condition (M=.7, SE=.02) was less 
accurate the warning condition (M=.78, SE=.03) and the warning plus recollection rejection 
instructions condition (M=.78, SE=.03), p=.023, p=.033. The two warning conditions did not 
differ from one another on overall accuracy.  
In order to examine the item x warning interaction one way ANOVAs were conducted for 
each item type. The one way ANOVA on unrelated items was not significant, F (2, 171) = 1.98, 
p=.14, ɳ
2
p =.023. The one way ANOVA on additive items was not significant, F (2, 171) = 2.11, 
p=.13, ɳ
2
p =.024. The one way ANOVA on the contradictory items was significant, F (2, 171) = 
5.04, p=.007, ɳ
2
p =.056. Posthoc tests using LSD test revealed that accuracy on the contradictory 
items was significantly higher in the warning + RR instructions conditions (M=.83, SE=.04) than 
the control condition (M=.67, SE=.03). The fact that the warning + RR instructions improved 
performance on the contradictory items suggests that the instructions about the use of 





In order to examine the differences in misinformation effects for contradictory items 
across warning conditions a one way ANOVA was conducted on contradictory item difference 
scores. The difference score was calculated by subtracting the unrelated item accuracy from the 
contradictory item accuracy because this reflects the misinformation effect. The one way 
ANOVA on contradictory item difference score was significant, F(2, 170)= 5.29, p=.006. 
Posthoc using LSD test revealed that there was a smaller misinformation effect in the warning + 
RR condition (M=.04, SD=.38) compared to the control condition (M= -.17, SD=.38), p=.002. 
Posthoc tests also revealed that the misinformation effect in the warning + RR condition (M=.04, 
SD=.38) was significantly smaller than the misinformation effect in the warning condition (M= -
.13, SD=.32), p=.021.  
In order to examine the differences in misinformation effects for additive items across 
warning conditions, a one way ANOVA was conducted on additive item difference scores. The 
difference score was calculated by subtracting the unrelated item accuracy from the additive item 
accuracy because this reflects the misinformation effect. The one way ANOVA on the additive 






Phantom ROC. We analyzed the data by fitting ROC curves using the phantom ROC 
model. As in prior work by Yonelinas and Lampinen, we used the Solver add-in to Excel to 
obtain parameter estimates by minimizing the sum of squared errors associated with the model.  
The best fitting ROC curves are shown in Figures 11-13 and parameter estimates for the model 
are shown in Table 4. Overall, the model provided an excellent fit, accounting for 99.5% of the 
variance in the control condition, 99.91% of the variance in the warning condition, and 99.88% 
of the variance in the warning + RR condition. 
Control Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 0% 
of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 17% of the time. For contradictory 
items, recollection rejection was used approximately 41% of the time and phantom recollection 
was used 31% of the time. 
Warning Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used approximately 3% 





items, recollection rejection was used approximately 52% of the time and phantom recollection 
was used 20% of the time. 
Warning + RR Condition. For additive items, recollection rejection was used 
approximately 0% of the time and phantom recollection was used approximately 0% of the time. 
For contradictory items, recollection rejection was used approximately 41% of the time and 
phantom recollection was used 10% of the time. 
Overall. For additive items, recollection rejection rates did not differ much across groups; 
however, phantom recollection was used 17% of the time in the control condition but estimates 
of phantom recollection decreased to 0% in the warning conditions. For contradictory items, 
recollection rejection rates were highest in the warning condition (52%) but this difference is 
likely not significant from the 41% measured in the control and warning + RR condition. 
Phantom recollection decreased with condition (control = 31%, warning = 20%, warning + RR = 
10%). For both types of misinformation, phantom recollection decreased with warnings but 












Table Four.  
Parameters Additive Items Contradictory Items 
Control 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
2.24 1.33 1.04 0.95 0.758 0.14 -0.5 0 0.17 0.37 0.41 0.31 0.57 
Warning   
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
4.4 1.66 1.17 1.11 0.867 0.224 -0.54 0.03 0.06 0.44 0.52 0.20 0.83 
Warning + RR 
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 RR  PhR d' RR PhR  d' 
1.91 1.24 0.92 0.84 0.572 0.068 -0.58 0 0 0.32 0.41 0.10 -0.05 
 
Self-Report. In order to establish inter-rater reliability, two research assistants coded the 
self-report data. Regarding recollection rejection, the agreement between RA1 (M=2.6, SD=1.44) 
and RA2 (M=3, SD=1.63) was r(179) = .84, p< .001. On unrelated items, the agreement between 





items, the agreement between RA1 (M=1.69, SD=.96) and RA2 (M=1.7, SD=.97) was 
r(179)=.93, p<.001. On additive items, the agreement between RA1 (M=.39, SD=.58) and RA2 
(M=.6, SD=.71) was r(179)=.73, p<.001.  
Control Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items 
was 53%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 13%. The self-
reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.  
Warning Condition. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 55%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The 
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 18%.  
Warning+RR Condition.  The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items was 62%. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 14%. The 
self-reported rate of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 23%.  
Overall. The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for contradictory items was 56%. 
The self-reported rate of recollection rejection for additive items was 13%. The self-reported rate 
of recollection rejection for unrelated items was 20%.  
In order to determine the effects of item type and delays on self-reported rates of 
recollection rejection a 3 (item: contradictory, additive, unrelated) x 3 (feedback: no warning, 
warning, warning + RR) ANOVA was conducted. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of item 
type, F (2, 342) = 171.87, p<.001, ɳ
2
p = .5. Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants 
reported using recollection rejection more for contradictory items (M=.57, SE=.02) than additive 
items (M=.13, SE=.02) and unrelated items (M=.2, SE=.02), p’s<.001. Pairwise comparisons 





SE=.02) than for additive items (M=.13, SE=.02), p=.009. There was no effect of feedback, F (1, 
171) = 1.75, p=.18, ɳ
2
p = .02. There was no interaction between the item type and warning, F (4, 
342) = .59, p=.67, ɳ
2
p = .007.  
Discussion 
 I was interested in the effects that warnings and instructions about the use of recollection 
rejection would have on the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm. The 
findings of this study replicated the results of the previous studies in that misinformation effects 
were established, contradictory misinformation acceptance was lower than additive 
misinformation acceptance, and recollection rejection was used to reject false information.  
However, my findings on warnings do not replicate previous research. In this study, only 
the warning in the warning plus recollection rejection instructions condition significantly 
reduced the misinformation effect. Simply warning participants in the warning-only condition 
failed to significantly reduce the misinformation effect. This finding contradicts the findings of 
Greene et al. (1982) who found that the misinformation effect was reduced when participants 
were only warned about misleading information before encountering it. There are a few 
explanations for my discrepant findings. Greene et al. (1982) used a multiple choice recognition 
test whereas I used an old/new recognition test. On Greene’s test, participants were faced with 
three choices when confronted with critical items; the choices were a) what they saw in the slide 
show, b) the piece of misinformation, or c) a piece of novel information. On my test, participants 
were faced with one choice when confronted with critical items: to endorse the misinformation 
or not. It is possible that after receiving a warning that it was easier to recognize the false details 





could only recognize the false details. Secondly, participants partook in two 14 minute long filler 
tasks in my study, whereas Greene used two 5 minute filler tasks. Perhaps this amount of time 
allowed participants to forget more about what they had seen in the slide show, making it even 
harder to reject the false information on the final test. Finally, Greene et al.’s warning differed 
from mine in that Greene provided an explanation as to why there were inaccurate details in the 
story participants were about to read.  Similar to Greene’s study, participants in my study were 
told that the summary they were about to read was written by a police officer. In Greene’s study, 
participants were told that “because the police cadet was inexperienced at detailing observed 
crimes, some of the information in the paragraph may be (have been) inaccurate” whereas in my 
study participants were told that “you should know that the summary contains some inaccurate 
details.” Could it be that the lack of explanation for the inaccurate details made participants 
question the existence of or extent of the inaccuracies in the summary?  
There was a decreased misinformation effect for the warning + RR condition. The 
difference between this condition and the warning condition were the instructions about the 
potential to use recollection rejection on the test. “You may be able to reject some of these 
inaccurate details by comparing what you saw in the slide show to other details when only one or 
the other could have occurred. For example, if you saw the man arrive at the house in a taxi and 
the test asked if he drove a car, you could reject the idea that he drove a car because you know he 
arrived in a taxi.” Sticking with the lack of explanation for inaccurate details hypothesis, these 
instructions could have provided participants with a reason why the inaccurate details occurred.  
With regards to the phantom recollection model and self-report results, I had expected to 
see increased rates of recollection rejection when participants were warned about misleading 





found using the phantom ROC model was that phantom recollection rates decreased for both 
additive and contradictory information in both warning conditions.  
One reason why recollection rejection rates may not have increased in the warning 
conditions could be due to the placement of the warning. Participants were warned right before 
they encountered the misleading details, which may have caused participants not to incorporate 
misleading details information into memory in the first place - a process known as discrepancy 
detection. If misinformation acceptance was reduced by discrepancy detection, it could prevent 
an increase in recollection rejection rates because by the time recollection rejection could have 
occurred (at test), discrepancy detection (at the time postevent information is encountered) may 
have already taken place.  
A second reason why recollection rejection rates may not have increased with the 
warning conditions could be that participants were already using recollection rejection as much 
as possible in the control condition. Our item types made the use of recollection rejection 
particularly easy in that our items were semantically related (i.e., Coke vs. Pepsi instead of Coke 
vs. apple or Coke vs. dog). Previous research has shown that when items are highly semantically 
related, recollection rejection is more likely to occur (Odegard, Lampinen, & Toglia, 2005).  
General Discussion 
Misinformation 
 The primary aim of these studies was to examine the use of recollection rejection in the 
misinformation paradigm but these studies also provide some new evidence about the 
misinformation paradigm itself. In all three of my studies, I found that participants accepted 





participants accepted more additive than contradictory misinformation after a one week delay 
(Frost, 2000) but to my knowledge mine are the first studies to demonstrate that participants 
accepted more additive misinformation than contradictory misinformation without a lengthy 
delay (which is how most misinformation studies are conducted). One previous study 
contradicted these results; however, Nemeth and Belli (2006) found that the acceptance of 
additive and contradictory misinformation did not differ for schemata knowledge. There are now 
four studies supporting the finding that additive misinformation is accepted significantly more 
than contradictory misinformation and only one which did not find support for this hypothesis. 
The study that did not find support for this hypothesis measured schemata knowledge in 
comparison to the other studies which measured memory for events. There may be something 
specific about schemata knowledge that eliminates the effect of rejecting more contradictory 
misinformation than additive misinformation. In addition, there is little theoretical basis to 
support the idea that additive and contradictory misinformation rates should be the same. Indeed, 
even Nemeth and Belli were surprised by the lack of difference in acceptance of additive and 
contradictory misinformation in their studies. They cited the short retention interval as a potential 
reason for their lack of findings; however, my research calls that explanation into question. In 
addition to this there is support for the hypothesis that additive misinformation should be 
accepted at higher rates than contradictory misinformation. Generally supporting this idea is the 
fact that there is already something specific in memory that can be used to reject contradictory 
misinformation. Specifically supporting this idea, there is proof for the use of memory editing 
strategies, such as recollection rejection, on contradictory misinformation but not so much for 





generalize the finding that additive misinformation is accepted more than contradictory 
misinformation.   
 There are important implications, for research in the misinformation paradigm, to draw 
from the differences in the acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation. In the over 
40 years of misinformation research, some studies have elicited the misinformation effect using 
contradictory misinformation (Loftus, 1978; Roediger, Jacoby, & McDermott, 1996) and others 
have elicited the misinformation effect using additive misinformation (Lane & Zaragoza, 1995; 
Loftus, 1975; Zaragoza & Mitchell, 1996). In particular these two types of misinformation have 
not been treated as though they are different. Few publications have discussed the implications of 
using additive versus contradictory misinformation on the size of misinformation effects or there 
relation to actual eyewitness memory. Meta-analyses on misinformation studies should take the 
type of misinformation used in each study into account. In addition to this other researchers 
should take the type of misinformation used in other studies into account before comparing the 
results of their studies to others or before comparing the results two of separate studies.  
Recollection Rejection 
 The finding that additive misinformation is accepted more than contradictory 
misinformation provides support that the higher rates of recollection rejection for contradictory 
items, as evidenced by the self-report results and the pROC model for my studies, caused the 
discrepancy in acceptance of additive and contradictory misinformation. It would appear that the 
use of recollection rejection on contradictory misinformation lead the rates of contradictory 





 It is important to point out that although the manipulations in my studies did not push 
around rates of recollection rejection that I did find consistent evidence for recollection rejection 
through three different measures in my studies. Across all three studies I found that participants 
accepted additive misinformation less than contradictory misinformation. While this does not 
provide direct evidence for the use of recollection rejection it does provide evidence that 
participants may have extra strategies available to them to reject contradictory misinformation in 
comparison to additive misinformation. In addition to this, I found evidence that participants 
self-reported the use of recollection rejection for contradictory misinformation more than for 
additive misinformation and that participants self-reported recollection rejection for additive 
misinformation no more than for unrelated items. Finally, the pROC curves for each of these 
studies indicated that participants used recollection rejection for contradictory misinformation. 
All together these measures provide solid evidence that people use recollection rejection when 
recollecting event details and in particular when misleading event details have an exclusive true 
detail that corresponds to them.  
These data provide insight into the role of recollection rejection in remembering events. 
One conclusion to draw from this research is that people use recollection rejection to reject false 
suggestions about events that they have witnessed. Previous research has established that people 
use recollection rejection to reject false suggestions in the form of words, pictures, and for 
narratives, but to my knowledge this is the first study to identify recollection rejection in the 
memory for events. The phantom ROC model and self-report judgments both identified the use 
of recollection rejection in the misinformation paradigm. In addition, the misinformation effect 
was larger for the additive items than contradictory items as hypothesized, potentially because 





In Experiment 1, I varied the length of the delays that participants encountered in the 
misinformation paradigm. To my knowledge, this is the first time that the effects of short term 
delays on misinformation effects have been measured. Fortunately for the years of research on 
the misinformation effect that have mostly disregarded the potential for varying delay times to 
affect participants’ memory, I did not find an effect of manipulating short term delays on the size 
of the misinformation effect. However, this was not the result hypothesized at the outset of this 
study. I believe now that the delay lengths were not long enough to identify an effect with the 
number of participants in the study, which led to inadequate power to detect differences. 
Similarly, I did not detect an effect of varying delays on the use of recollection rejection. I 
hypothesized that the reason for this is that the delay manipulation was not strong enough (i.e., 
the difference between delay lengths was not long enough). Previous research has found that 
manipulating delays on a larger timescale affects the ability to use recollection rejection, but my 
study revealed a diminished effect on shorter timescales (Brainerd, Reyna, and Kneer, 1995). 
Future research should examine the effects of delays of varying lengths from hours to days to 
establish when exactly delays start to affect misinformation acceptance and the use of 
recollection rejection.  
In Experiment 2, I introduced warnings about misinformation and instructions about the 
ability to use recollection rejection. In past research, warnings about misinformation have 
reduced the acceptance of postevent information (Greene et al., 1982). Warnings placed after 
postevent information have sometimes been found to reduce the misinformation effect but this 
finding has been difficult to replicate. Therefore, I chose to place the warning where it has 
previously been effective: before encountering postevent information. Unfortunately, the 





rejection instructions. It may be possible that the recollection rejection instructions provided a 
reason for why inaccurate details were present leading participants to reject them whereas in the 
warning study participants only received the information that inaccurate details were present 
without an explanation. It may have been harder for participants to come to believe that false 
information was presented to them without an explanation as to why. Recollection rejection rates 
were not increased in the warning-only or warning + RR conditions. Previous research has found 
that giving participants instructions about the use of recollection rejection substantially increases 
their use of recollection rejection. There are a few reasons why recollection rejection instructions 
may not have inflated the use of recollection rejection in my study. One reason why recollection 
rejection rates may not have increased is that participants may have already been using 
recollection rejection to the best of their ability even before receiving instructions about the use 
of recollection rejection. In this case it would make it difficult to increase rates of recollection 
rejection. Another explanation is that there may not have been enough participants in the study to 
make it possible to detect the differences in the use of recollection rejection across feedback 
conditions. Future research should examine the effects of warnings about misinformation and 
recollection rejection instructions in order to determine their exact effects in memory for events.  
Conclusions 
This series of studies examined the use of recollection rejection in the misinformation 
paradigm and the differences between the acceptance of additive and contradictory 
misinformation. I found that participants use recollection rejection and report using recollection 
rejection to reject contradictory misinformation. Participants are also more likely to report 
additive misinformation than contradictory misinformation which provides some indication that 





misinformation. Future research should examine the use of memory editing strategies on event 
based memories in order to gain a clearer picture of when they are used and to what extent they 
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Appendix C: Adult Information Form 
Adult Information Form 
You are participating in the ‘Memory for 
Events’ project.  Section A asks for your 
birthdate.  Section B asks you some questions 
about you. Section C is to be filled out by the 
research assistant on the day you participate. 
Please complete the information in Sections A 
and B. 
Section A. To Be Completed By You 
 
Date of Birth: 
Month: ______   Day: ____  Year: _____ 
 
 
Section B. To Be Completed By You 
Are you male or female? __________ 
 
How would you describe your 
race/ethnicity? ____________________ 
 
What languages do you speak? 
____________________ 
 
Are you a native English speaker?  ______ 
 
Section C. To Be Completed By Research 
Assistant 
Participant Number: ______________ 
 
What condition is the participant in? 
__________ 
 
Note: Once all sessions are completed, 
Section A will be cut away from this form 




















Appendix D: Critical Item Counterbalance 
  Narrative 1 & 4 Narrative 2 & 5 Narrative 3 & 6 
Suggested 
(N1, 2, 3) A 
Suggested 
(N4, 5, 6) B 
Magazine Unrelated Additive Contradictory Time People 
Tries On Unrelated Additive Contradictory Ring Watch 
Key Unrelated Additive Contradictory Flower Pot Doormat 
Bed Additive Contradictory Unrelated Made Unmade 
Note 
Location Additive Contradictory Unrelated Kitchen 
Living 
Room 
Fruit Additive Contradictory Unrelated Apple Banana 
Soda Contradictory Unrelated Additive Coca-Cola Pepsi 
Jewelry Contradictory Unrelated Additive Bracelet Necklace 
Baseball 























Appendix E: Narratives 
Contradictory items are in bold and Additive items are underlined.  
Narrative One 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city.  Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway.  After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowner on 
the counter in the kitchen. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although being an 
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy.  He 
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, thinking he was 
hungry, he took an apple. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the kitchen but found 
nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked 
over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and 
fixed the loose oven handle.  Once his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he 
helped himself to a Coca-Cola from the fridge.  Always curious about the secret lives of his 
customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the built-in desk, but 
there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided 
to pocket them. 
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out.  He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric decided to sit down on the couch. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little 
guilty and decided it was time to get back to work.  He started by examining a piece of siding on 
the back door that had been torn down, perhaps by a dog.  He retrieved his hammer and put the 
siding back up. Then he knelt down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said 
was not working.  Once that was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and opened it to examine its contents. He tried on a red cap and checked 
his reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back. 
Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. 
Eric then headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing 
interesting. He examined the bedspread on the nicely made-up bed. He thought he might like to 
get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, 
including some jewelry. He picked up a bracelet, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of 
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket.  
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 





fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle that was on the fireplace mantle with a 
black lighter. He sat down on the patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the 
wooden coffee table and flicked through it.  Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got 
up and turned the CD off.  He retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back.  On his way out, 
Eric decided to have a quick look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some 
prescription pills that he thought he might be able to sell.  By now, he was late for his next job, 
so Eric hurried to the door and closed it behind him as he left. 
Narrative Two 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left 
for him from under a flowerpot.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on 
the counter in the kitchen. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although being an 
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy.  He 
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, thinking he was 
hungry, he took an apple. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the kitchen but found 
nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked 
over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and 
fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he then looked in the fridge to 
see he could find anything to drink. Always curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric 
rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t 
much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket 
them. 
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read Time magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it back 
on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was time to 
get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had been torn 
down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt down to 
fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that was done, 
Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. Eric did not find anything that interested him 
there. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric 
headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He 





like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, including some 
jewelry. He found a ring that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket. 
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the 
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the 
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked 
through it.  Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He 
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick 
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he 
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed 
it behind him as he left. 
Narrative Three 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left 
for him from under a flowerpot.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house. Eric put his tool box down. Although being an 
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He 
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He found nothing interesting in the kitchen 
cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent 
down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once 
his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Coca-Cola from 
the fridge. Always curious about the secret lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile 
of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. 
In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket them. 
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by "The Band" that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read Time magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it back 
on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was time to 
get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had been torn 
down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt down to 
fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that was done, 
Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. He tried on a red cap and checked his reflection 
in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back. Next, Eric 





bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He thought he might like 
to get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, 
including some jewelry. He picked up a bracelet, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of 
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket. He also found a ring that fit him 
nicely and slipped it into his pocket.   
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the 
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the 
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked 
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He 
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick 
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he 
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed 
it behind him as he left. 
Narrative Four 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city.  Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway.  After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on 
the end table in the living room. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although 
being an electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be 
nosy.  He walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, 
thinking he was hungry, he took a banana. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the 
kitchen but found nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to 
work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers 
from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle.  Once his kitchen repair was finished, he was 
feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Pepsi from the fridge.  Always curious about the secret 
lives of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the built-in 
desk, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks and 
decided to pocket them. 
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out.  He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric decided to sit down on the couch. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little 
guilty and decided it was time to get back to work.  He started by examining a piece of siding on 





siding back up. Then he knelt down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said 
was not working.  Once that was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and opened it to examine its contents. He tried on a black cap and 
checked his reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it 
back. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. 
Eric then headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing 
interesting. He examined the bedspread on the unmade bed. He thought he might like to get a 
bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, 
including some jewelry. He picked up a necklace, which he inspected carefully and—thinking of 
his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket.  
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick knacks on the 
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle that was on the fireplace mantle with a 
black lighter. He sat down on the patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the 
wooden coffee table and flipped through it.  Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got 
up and turned the CD off.  He retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back.  On his way out, 
Eric decided to have a quick look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some 
prescription pills that he thought he might be able to sell.  By now, he was late for his next job, 
so Eric hurried to the door and closed it behind him as he left. 
Narrative Five 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left 
for him from under a doormat.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house, where he found a note from the homeowners on 
the end table in the living room. After reading the note, Eric put his tool box down. Although 
being an electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be 
nosy.  He walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He saw a basket of fruit and, 
thinking he was hungry, took a banana. After taking a bite, he continued looking around the 
kitchen but found nothing interesting in the kitchen cabinets. Thinking he should get down to 
work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent down to examine it. Eric took the pliers 
from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once his kitchen repair was finished, he then 
looked in the fridge to see he could find anything to drink. Always curious about the secret lives 
of his customers, Eric rummaged through a pile of papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen 
bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In the drawers, Eric found blank checks 





Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by “The Band” that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read People magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it 
back on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was 
time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had 
been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt 
down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that 
was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. Eric did not find anything that interested him 
there. Next, Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric 
headed to the master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He 
examined the bedspread on the unmade bed. He thought he might like to get a bedspread like 
the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on the dresser, including some 
jewelry. He found a watch that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket. 
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the 
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the 
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flicked 
through it.  Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He 
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick 
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he 
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed 
it behind him as he left. 
Narrative Six 
One afternoon, Eric Lewis, an average looking (although dishonest) guy with brown hair, had a 
job at a house in the city. Eric pulled up to the house and parked in the driveway. After getting 
his yellow tool box out of the van, Eric went to the front door and retrieved the key that was left 
for him from under a doormat.  
He unlocked the door and walked into the house. Eric put his tool box down. Although being an 
electrician could get boring, one thing Eric liked about his job was that he could be nosy. He 
walked into the kitchen and began looking around. He found nothing interesting in the kitchen 
cabinets. Thinking he should get down to work, Eric walked over to the broken oven and bent 
down to examine it. Eric took the pliers from his pocket and fixed the loose oven handle. Once 
his kitchen repair was finished, he was feeling thirsty so he helped himself to a Pepsi from the 





papers next to a dog leash on the kitchen bench, but there wasn’t much interesting there either. In 
the drawers, Eric found blank checks and decided to pocket them. 
Next, Eric walked into the living room and noticed some CDs lying out. He started to look 
through the pile of CDs. After selecting a CD by "The Band" that he knew he would enjoy, Eric 
placed it in the stereo, thinking he would listen to it while he finished his work in the living 
room. Eric sat down on the couch to read People magazine, but found it boring, and tossed it 
back on the floor. After a little time passed, Eric began to feel a little guilty and decided it was 
time to get back to work. He started by examining a piece of siding on the back door that had 
been torn down, perhaps by a dog. He retrieved his hammer and put the siding back up. He knelt 
down to fix one of the electrical sockets that the homeowners said was not working. Once that 
was done, Eric got up to have a look around the room. 
He found a hall closet and examined its contents. He tried on a black cap and checked his 
reflection in the mirror, but he didn’t really like the way it looked on him so he put it back. Next, 
Eric looked through another hall closet but it only contained towels. Then Eric headed to the 
master bedroom. He searched through one closet but found nothing interesting. He thought he 
might like to get a bedspread like the one on the bed for himself. Eric checked out the items on 
the dresser, including some jewelry. He picked up a necklace, which he inspected carefully 
and—thinking of his girlfriend’s upcoming birthday—slipped it into his pocket. He also found a 
watch that fit him nicely and slipped it into his pocket.   
Since his work was done, Eric decided that he deserved to relax for a while. He headed back into 
the living room and looked around again. He found some interesting knick-knacks on the 
fireplace mantle and examined them. He also lit a candle with a black lighter. He sat down on the 
patterned chair, finding a photo album that was lying on the wooden coffee table and flipped 
through it. Realizing he needed to get to his next job, Eric got up and turned the CD off. He 
retrieved the CD from the stereo and put it back. On his way out, Eric decided to have a quick 
look through the bathroom cabinet, where he pocketed some prescription pills that he thought he 
might be able to sell. By now, he was late for his next job, so Eric hurried to the door and closed 












Appendix F: Test One 
Test for Narratives 1, 2, & 3. 
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing your 
memory for this video.  
 
        Each question has three parts:  
      1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;  
   2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer.  
  3) the third part asks you to explain the reasons for your answer. 
   Please complete all three steps for every question.  
    
 
        
 
      
         
         
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE 





















1) The man read a Time magazine. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 





      
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 
 
 









      2) There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
3) 
The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the 
fridge. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     4) The bed in the bedroom was made.  Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 





      
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 
 
 














5) The man sat in a patterned chair. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
6) 
There was a white microwave on the kitchen 
counter. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
7) 
The man read a note from the homeowners in the 
kitchen.  Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     8) The man had blonde hair. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 
     
 
Yes No 
    
         
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
    
         
 
1 2 3 4 
    
 







Confident     





9) The man tried on a ring in the bedroom. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     10) The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     11) The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     12) The man stole a bracelet. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 
     
 
Yes No 
    
         
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
    
         
 
1 2 3 4 
    
 







Confident     







13) The man fixed an electrical socket. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     14) The man ate an apple. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     15) The man looked through a photo album. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
16) 
The man wore a white 
shirt. 
  
Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 
     
 
Yes No 
    
         
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
    
         
 
1 2 3 4 
    
 







Confident     






17) The man stole pills from the bathroom. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     18) The man tried on a red cap. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     19) The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     20) There was a treadmill in the living room. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 















21) The man picked up a blue coffee mug. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
22) 
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door 
frame. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     
23) 
The man found the key to the door under a flower 
pot. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     24) The man carried a yellow tool box.  Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 
















Appendix G: Test Two 
Test for Narratives 4, 5, & 6.  
You will now be asked some questions about the video you saw. We are testing your 
memory for this video.  
 
        Each question has three parts:  
      1) the first part asks you about a particular item from the video;  
   2) the second part asks you how confident you are about your answer.  
  3) the third part asks you to explain the reasons for your answer. 
   Please complete all three steps for every question.  
    
 
        
 
      
         
         
WHEN YOU HAVE READ AND UNDERSTOOD HOW TO ANSWER THESE 




















1) The man read a People magazine. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 





      
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 
 
 









      2) There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     3) The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge. Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     4) The bed in the bedroom was unmade.  Please explain the reasons 
for your answer. 





      
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
 
      
 
1 2 3 4 
 
 














1 2 3 4
6)
1 2 3 4
7)
1 2 3 4
8)
1 2 3 4
The man had blonde hair. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man read a note from the 
homeowners in the living room. 
There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man sat in a patterned chair. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 














9) The man tried on a watch in the bedroom. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     10) The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     11) The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     12) The man stole a necklace. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 
     
 
Yes No 
    
         
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
    
         
 
1 2 3 4 
    
 







Confident     






1 2 3 4
14)
1 2 3 4
15)
1 2 3 4
16) The man wore a white shirt.
1 2 3 4
Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man looked through a photo album. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man ate a banana. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man fixed an electrical socket. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 














1 2 3 4
18)
1 2 3 4
19)
1 2 3 4
20)
1 2 3 4
There was a treadmill in the living room. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man tried on a black cap. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 








The man stole pills from the bathroom. Please explain the reasons for 
your answer.
Yes No
How confident are you that your answer is correct? 













21) The man picked up a blue coffee mug. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     22) The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door 
frame. 
Please explain the 





     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     23) The man found the key to the door under a door mat. Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 









     24) The man carried a yellow tool box.  Please explain the 
reasons for your answer. 




     
 
How confident are you that your answer is correct?  
     
 
1 2 3 4 
 















   Appendix H: Test Keys 
   Counterbalance One: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Unrelated The man read a Time magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Contradictory The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Additive The bed in the bedroom was made.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Additive The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Unrelated The man tried on a ring in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Contradictory The man stole a bracelet. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Additive The man ate an apple. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Contradictory The man tried on a red cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Target The man picked up a blue coffee mug. No 
22 Target 
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door 
frame. Yes 
23 Unrelated The man found the key to the door under a flower pot. No 













Counterbalance Two: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Additive The man read a Time magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Unrelated The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Contradictory The bed in the bedroom was made.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Contradictory The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Additive The man tried on a ring in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Unrelated The man stole a bracelet. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Contradictory The man ate an apple. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Unrelated The man tried on a red cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Foil The man picked up a red coffee mug. No 
22 Target 
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door 
frame. Yes 
23 Additive The man found the key to the door under a flower pot. No 














Counterbalance Three: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Contradictory The man read a Time magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Additive The man drank a Coca-Cola that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Unrelated The bed in the bedroom was made.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Unrelated The man read a note from the homeowners in the kitchen.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Contradictory The man tried on a ring in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Additive The man stole a bracelet. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Unrelated The man ate an apple. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Additive The man tried on a red cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Foil The man picked up a red coffee mug. No 
22 Target 
The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door 
frame. Yes 
23 Contradictory The man found the key to the door under a flower pot. No 














Counterbalance Four: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Unrelated The man read a People magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Contradictory The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Additive The bed in the bedroom was unmade.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Additive 
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living 
room.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Unrelated The man tried on a watch in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Contradictory The man stole a necklace. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Additive The man ate a banana. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Contradictory The man tried on a black cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Foil The man picked up a blue coffee mug. No 
22 Target The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame. Yes 
23 Unrelated The man found the key to the door under a door mat. No 














Counterbalance Five: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Additive The man read a People magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Unrelated The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Contradictory The bed in the bedroom was unmade.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Contradictory 
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living 
room.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Additive The man tried on a watch in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Unrelated The man stole a necklace. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Contradictory The man ate a banana. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Unrelated The man tried on a black cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Foil The man picked up a blue coffee mug. No 
22 Target The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame. Yes 
23 Additive The man found the key to the door under a door mat. No 














Counterbalance Six: Test Key 
# Item Question Answer 
1 Contradictory The man read a People magazine. No 
2 Target There was a bag of dog food on the kitchen counter. Yes 
3 Additive The man drank a Pepsi that he got from the fridge. No 
4 Unrelated The bed in the bedroom was unmade.  No 
5 Target The man sat in a patterned chair. Yes 
6 Foil There was a white microwave on the kitchen counter. No 
7 Unrelated 
The man read a note from the homeowners in the living 
room.  No 
8 Foil The man had blonde hair. No 
9 Contradictory The man tried on a watch in the bedroom. No 
10 Target The man listened to a CD by "The Band". Yes 
11 Foil The man stole a credit card from a drawer.  No 
12 Additive The man stole a necklace. No 
13 Target The man fixed an electrical socket. Yes 
14 Unrelated The man ate a banana. No 
15 Target The man looked through a photo album. Yes 
16 Target The man wore a white shirt. Yes 
17 Target The man stole pills from the bathroom Yes 
18 Additive The man tried on a black cap. No 
19 Target The man lit a candle with a black lighter. Yes 
20 Foil There was a treadmill in the living room. No 
21 Foil The man picked up a blue coffee mug. No 
22 Target The man used a hammer to fix the siding on the door frame. Yes 
23 Contradictory The man found the key to the door under a door mat. No 














Appendix I: Self Report Survey 
1) Did you recognize the man in the video? If so, in what way (i.e., ‘I’ve seen him around’ 
or ‘We’re friends’)?  
 
2) Were you at all suspicious about being tricked during the study? If so, please explain and 




3) Did you know about the misinformation effect prior to participating in this study?  
 
 
4) If you answered yes to question 3, please briefly describe the misinformation effect. 
 
 
5) If you answered yes to question 3, were you aware that this study was about the 


















Appendix J: Warning Scripts 
Warning 
Now, I am going have you answer some questions about the video you saw earlier. You may 
remember me telling you earlier that some of the details in the narrative were inaccurate. Keep 
this in mind when answering questions on the test. Respond according to what you saw in video. 
Make sure to read the instructions at the top of the page before beginning and complete every 
step asked of you. Please, try to be as accurate as possible.  
Warning + RR 
Now, I am going have you answer some questions about the video you saw earlier. You may 
remember me telling you earlier that some of the details in the narrative were inaccurate. You 
may be able to reject some of these inaccurate details by comparing what you saw in the video to 
other details when only one or the other could have occurred. For example, if you had seen the 
man arrive at the house in a taxi and the test asked if he drove a car you could reject the idea that 
he drove a car because you know he arrived in a taxi. Keep this in mind when answering 
questions on the test. Respond according to what you saw in video. Make sure to read the 
instructions at the top of the page before beginning and complete every step asked of you. Please, 
try to be as accurate as possible.  
 
 
